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Abstract
Imitation learning algorithms can be used to learn a policy from expert demonstrations
without access to a reward signal. However, most existing approaches are not applicable in
multi-agent settings due to the existence of multiple (Nash) equilibria and non-stationary
environments. We propose a new framework for multi-agent imitation learning for general
Markov games, where we build upon a generalized notion of inverse reinforcement learning.
We further introduce a practical multi-agent actor-critic algorithm with good empirical
performance. Our method can be used to imitate complex behaviors in high-dimensional
environments with multiple cooperative or competing agents.
1. Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) methods are becoming increasingly successful at optimizing
reward signals in complex, high dimensional environments (Espeholt et al., 2018). A key
limitation of RL, however, is the difficulty of designing suitable reward functions for complex
and not well-specified tasks (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2017; Amodei et al., 2016). If the
reward function does not cover all important aspects of the task, the agent could easily learn
undesirable behaviors (Amodei and Clark, 2016). This problem is further exacerbated in multi-
agent scenarios, such as multiplayer games (Peng et al., 2017), multi-robot control (Matignon
et al., 2012) and social interactions (Leibo et al., 2017); in these cases, agents do not even
necessarily share the same reward function, especially in competitive settings where the
agents might have conflicting rewards.
Imitation learning methods address these problems via expert demonstrations (Ziebart
et al., 2008; Englert and Toussaint, 2015; Finn et al., 2016; Stadie et al., 2017); the agent
directly learns desirable behaviors by imitating an expert. Notably, inverse reinforcement
learning (IRL) frameworks assume that the expert is (approximately) optimizing an un-
derlying reward function, and attempt to recover a reward function that rationalizes the
demonstrations; an agent policy is subsequently learned through RL (Ng et al., 2000; Abbeel
and Ng, 2004). Unfortunately, this paradigm is not suitable for general multi-agent settings
due to environment being non-stationary to individual agents (Lowe et al., 2017) and the
existence of multiple equilibrium solutions (Hu et al., 1998). The optimal policy of one agent
could depend on the policies of other agents, and vice versa, so there could exist multiple
solutions in which each agents’ policy is the optimal response to others.
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In this paper, we propose a new framework for multi-agent imitation learning – provided
with demonstrations of a set of experts interacting with each other within the same environ-
ment, we aim to learn multiple parametrized policies that imitate the behavior of each expert
respectively. Using the framework of Markov games, we integrate multi-agent RL with a
suitable extension of multi-agent inverse RL. The resulting procedure strictly generalizes
Generative Adversarial Imitation Learning (GAIL, (Ho and Ermon, 2016)) in the single
agent case. Imitation learning corresponds to a two-player game between a generator and a
discriminator. The generator controls the policies of all the agents in a distributed way, and
the discriminator contains a classifier for each agent that is trained to distinguish that agent’s
behavior from that of the corresponding expert. Upon training, the behaviors produced by
the policies are indistinguishable from the training data through the discriminator. We can
incorporate prior knowledge into the discriminators, including the presence of cooperative
or competitive agents. In addition, we propose a novel multi-agent natural policy gradient
algorithm that addresses the issue of high variance gradient estimates commonly observed in
reinforcement learning (Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2016). Empirical results demonstrate
that our method can imitate complex behaviors in high-dimensional environments, such as
particle environments and cooperative robotic control tasks, with multiple cooperative or
competitive agents; the imitated behaviors are close to the expert behaviors with respect to
“true” reward functions which the agents do not have access to during training.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 Markov games
We consider an extension of Markov decision processes (MDPs) called Markov games (Littman,
1994). A Markov game (MG) for N agents is defined via a set of states S, N sets of actions
{Ai}Ni=1. The function T : S ×A1 × · · · × AN → P(S) describes the (stochastic) transition
process between states, where P(S) denotes the set of probability distributions over the set
S. Given that we are in state st at time t, the agents take actions (a1, . . . , aN ) and the state
transitions to st+1 with probability T (st+1|st, a1, . . . , aN ).
Each agent i obtains a (bounded) reward given by a function ri : S ×A1× · · ·×AN → R.
Each agent i aims to maximize its own total expected return Ri =
∑∞
t=0 γ
tri,t, where γ is
the discount factor and T is the time horizon, by selecting actions through a (stationary and
Markovian) stochastic policy pii : S × Ai → [0, 1]. The initial states are determined by a
distribution η : S → [0, 1].
The joint policy is defined as pi(a|s) = ∏Ni=1 pii(ai|s), where we use bold variables without
subscript i to denote the concatenation of all variables for all agents (e.g. pi denotes the
joint policy
∏N
i=1 pii in a multi-agent setting, r denotes all rewards, a denotes actions of all
agents).
We use expectation with respect to a policy pi to denote an expectation with respect to
the trajectories it generates. For example,
Epi [r(s, a)] , Est,at∼pi
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, at)
]
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denotes the following sample process for the right hand side: s0 ∼ η, at ∼ pi(at|st), st+1 ∼
T (st+1|at, st), yet if we do not take expectation over the state s, then
Epi
[
r(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
T (s′|s, a)v(s′)
]
, Ea∼pi(·|s)
[
r(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
T (s′|s, a)v(s′)
]
assumes the policy samples only the next-step action a.
We use subscript −i to denote all agents except for i. For example, (ai, a−i) represents
(a1, . . . , aN ), the actions of all N agents.
2.2 Reinforcement learning and Nash equilibrium
In reinforcement learning (RL), the goal of each agent is to maximize total expected return
Epi[r(s, a)] given access to the reward signal r. In single agent RL, an optimal Markovian
policy exists but the optimal policy might not be unique (e.g., all policies are optimal for an
identically zero reward; see Sutton and Barto (1998), Chapter 3.8). An entropy regularizer
can be introduced to resolve this ambiguity. The optimal policy is found via the following
RL procedure:
RL(r) = arg max
pi∈Π
H(pi) + Epi[r(s, a)], (1)
where H(pi) is the γ-discounted causal entropy (Bloem and Bambos, 2014) of policy pi ∈ Π.
Definition 1 (γ-discounted Causal Entropy) The γ-discounted causal entropy for a pol-
icy pi is defined as follows:
H(pi) , Epi[− log pi(a|s)] = Est,at∼pi
[
−
∞∑
t=0
γt log pi(at|st)
]
If we scale the reward function by any positive value, the addition of H(pi) resolves
ambiguity by selecting the policy among the set of optimal policies that have the highest
causal entropy1 – the policy with both the highest reward and the highest entropy is unique
because the entropy function is concave with respect to pi and the set of optimal policies is
convex.
In Markov games, however, the optimal policy of an agent depends on other agents’ policies.
One approach is to use an equilibrium solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium (Hu et al.,
1998). Informally, a set of policies {pii}Ni=1 is a Nash equilibrium if no agent can achieve higher
reward by unilaterally changing its policy, i.e. ∀i ∈ [1, N ],∀pˆii 6= pii,Epii,pi−i [ri] ≥ Epˆii,pi−i [ri].
The process of finding a Nash equilibrium can be defined as a constrained optimization
problem (Filar and Vrieze (2012), Theorem 3.7.2):
min
pi∈Π,v∈RS×N
fr(pi,v) =
N∑
i=1
(∑
s∈S
vi(s)− Eai∼pii(·|s)qi(s, ai)
)
(2)
vi(s) ≥ qi(s, ai) , Epi−i
[
ri(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s′|s,a)vi(s′)
]
∀i ∈ [N ], s ∈ S, ai ∈ Ai (3)
a , (ai, a−i) , (a1, . . . , aN ) v , [v1; . . . ; vN ]
1. For the remainder of the paper, we may use the term “entropy” to denote the γ-discounted causal entropy
for policies.
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where the joint action a includes actions a−i sampled from pi−i and ai. Intuitively, v could
represent some estimated value function for each state and q represents the Q-function
that corresponds to v. The constraints enforce the Nash equilibrium condition – when the
constraints are satisfied, (vi(s)− qi(s, ai)) is non-negative for every i ∈ [N ]. Hence fr(pi,v)
is always non-negative for a feasible (pi,v). Moreover, this objective has a global minimum
of zero if a Nash equilibrium exists, and pi forms a Nash equilibrium if and only if fr(pi,v)
reaches zero while being a feasible solution (Prasad and Bhatnagar (2015), Theorem 2.4).
2.3 Inverse reinforcement learning
Suppose we do not have access to the reward signal r, but have demonstrations D provided by
an expert (N expert agents in Markov games). Imitation learning aims to learn policies that
behave similarly to these demonstrations. In Markov games, we assume all experts/players
operate in the same environment, and the demonstrations D = {(sj , aj)}Mj=1 are collected by
sampling s0 ∼ η(s),at = piE(at|st), st+1 ∼ T (st+1|st,at); we assume knowledge of N , γ, S,
A, as well as access to T and η as black boxes. We further assume that once we obtain D, we
cannot ask for additional expert interactions with the environment (unlike in DAgger (Ross
et al., 2011) or CIRL (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016)).
Let us first consider imitation in Markov decision processes (as a special case to Markov
games) and the framework of single-agent Maximum Entropy IRL (Ziebart et al., 2008; Ho
and Ermon, 2016) where the goal is to recover a reward function r that rationalizes the
expert behavior piE :
IRL(piE) = arg max
r∈RS×A
EpiE [r(s, a)]−
(
max
pi∈Π
H(pi) + Epi[r(s, a)]
)
In practice, expectations with respect to piE are evaluated using samples from D.
The IRL objective is ill-defined (Ng et al., 2000; Finn et al., 2016) and there are often
multiple valid solutions to the problem when we consider all r ∈ RS×A. For example, we
can assign the reward function for trajectories that are not visited by the expert arbitrarily
so long as these trajectories yields lower rewards than the expert trajectories. To resolve
this ambiguity, Ho and Ermon (2016) introduce a convex reward function regularizer ψ :
RS×A → R, which can be used to restrict rewards to be linear in a pre-determined set of
features (Ho and Ermon, 2016):
IRLψ(piE) = arg max
r∈RS×A
−ψ(r) + EpiE [r(s, a)]−
(
max
pi∈Π
H(pi) + Epi[r(s, a)]
)
(4)
2.4 Imitation by matching occupancy measures
Ho and Ermon (2016) interpret the imitation learning problem as matching two occu-
pancy measures, i.e., the distribution over states and actions encountered when navigat-
ing the environment with a policy. Formally, for a policy pi, it is defined as ρpi(s, a) =
pi(a|s)∑∞t=0 γtT (st = s|pi). Ho and Ermon (2016) draw a connection between IRL and
occupancy measure matching, showing that the former is a dual of the latter:
Proposition 2 (Proposition 3.1 in (Ho and Ermon, 2016))
RL ◦ IRLψ(piE) = arg min
pi∈Π
−H(pi) + ψ?(ρpi − ρpiE )
4
Here ψ?(x) = supy x>y − ψ(y) is the convex conjugate of ψ, which could be interpreted as a
measure of similarity between the occupancy measures of expert policy and agent’s policy.
One instance of ψ = ψGA gives rise to the Generative Adversarial Imitation Learning (GAIL)
method:
ψ?GA(ρpi − ρpiE ) = max
D∈(0,1)S×A
EpiE [log(D(s, a))] + Epi[log(1−D(s, a))] (5)
The resulting imitation learning method from Proposition 2 involves a discriminator (a
classifier D) competing with a generator (a policy pi). The discriminator attempts to
distinguish real vs. synthetic trajectories (produced by pi) by optimizing (5). The generator,
on the other hand, aims to perform optimally under the reward function defined by the
discriminator, thus “fooling” the discriminator with synthetic trajectories that are difficult to
distinguish from the expert ones.
3. Generalizing IRL to Markov games
Extending imitation learning to multi-agent settings is difficult because there are multiple
rewards (one for each agent) and the notion of optimality is complicated by the need to
consider an equilibrium solution (Hu et al., 1998). We use MARL(r) to denote the set of
(stationary and Markovian) policies that form a Nash equilibrium under r and have the
maximum γ-discounted causal entropy (among all equilibria):
MARL(r) = arg min
pi∈Π,v∈RS×N
fr(pi,v)−H(pi) (6)
vi(s) ≥ qi(s, ai) ∀i ∈ [N ], s ∈ S, ai ∈ Ai
where q is defined as in Eq. 3. Our goal is to define a suitable inverse operator MAIRL,
in analogy to IRL in Eq. 4. The key idea of Eq. 4 is to choose a reward that creates a
margin between the expert and every other policy. However, the constraints in the Nash
equilibrium optimization (Eq. 6) can make this challenging. To that end, we derive an
equivalent Lagrangian formulation of (6), where we “move” the constraints into the objective
function, so that we can define a margin between the expected reward of two sets of policies
that captures their “difference”.
3.1 Equivalent constraints via temporal difference learning
Intuitively, the Nash equilibrium constraints imply that any agent i cannot improve pii via
1-step temporal difference learning; if the condition for Equation 3 is not satisfied for some
vi, qi, and (s, ai), this would suggest that we can update the policy for agent i and its
value function. Based on this notion, we can derive equivalent versions of the constraints
corresponding to t-step temporal difference (TD) learning.
Theorem 3 For a certain policy pi and reward r, let vˆi(s;pi, r) be the unique solution to the
Bellman equation:
vˆi(s;pi, r) = Epi
[
ri(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s′|s,a)vˆi(s′;pi, r)
]
∀s ∈ S
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Denote qˆ(t)i ({s(j),a(j)}t−1j=0, s(t), a(t)i ;pi, r) as the discounted expected return for the i-th agent
conditioned on visiting the trajectory {s(j),a(j)}t−1j=0, s(t) in the first t− 1 steps and choosing
action a(t)i at the t step, when other agents use policy pi−i:
qˆ
(t)
i ({s(j),a(j)}t−1j=0, s(t), a(t)i ;pi, r)
=
t−1∑
j=0
γjri(s
(j), a(j)) + γtEpi−i
[
ri(s
(t),a(t)) + γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s′|s,a(t))vˆi(s′;pi, r)
]
Then pi is Nash equilibrium if and only if
vˆi(s
(0);pi, r) ≥ Epi−i
[
qˆ
(t)
i ({s(j),a(j)}t−1j=0, s(t), a(t)i ;pi, r)
]
, Q(t)i ({s(j), a(j)i }tj=0;pi, r) (7)
∀t ∈ N+, i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [t], s(j) ∈ S, a(j) ∈ A
Intuitively, Theorem 3 states that if we replace the 1-step constraints with (t+ 1)-step
constraints, we obtain the same solution as MARL(r), since (t+ 1)-step TD updates (over
one agent at a time) is still stationary with respect to a Nash equilibrium solution. So the
constraints can be unrolled for t steps and rewritten as vˆi(s(0)) ≥ Q(t)i ({s(j), a(j)i }tj=0;pi, r)
(corresponding to Equation 7).
3.2 Multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning
We are now ready to construct the Lagrangian dual of the primal in Equation 6, using
the equivalent formulation from Theorem 3. The first observation is that for any policy pi,
f(pi, vˆ) = 0 when vˆ is defined as in Theorem 3 (see Lemma 8 in appendix). Therefore, we
only need to consider the “unrolled” constraints from Theorem 3, obtaining the following
dual problem
max
λ≥0
min
pi
L
(t+1)
r (pi, λ) ,
N∑
i=1
∑
τi∈T ti
λ(τi)
(
Q
(t)
i (τi;pi, r)− vˆi(s(0);pi, r)
)
(8)
where Ti(t) is the set of all length-t trajectories of the form {s(j), a(j)i }tj=0, with s(0) as initial
state, λ is a vector of N · |Ti(t)| Lagrange multipliers, and vˆ is defined as in Theorem 3. This
dual formulation is a sum over agents and trajectories, which uniquely corresponds to the
constraints in Equation 7.
In the following theorem, we show that for a specific choice of λ we can recover the
difference of the sum of expected rewards between two policies, a performance gap similar to
the one used in single agent IRL in Eq. (4). This amounts to “relaxing” the primal problem.
Theorem 4 For any two policies pi? and pi, let
λ?pi(τi) = η(s
(0))pii(a
(0)
i |s(0))
t∏
j=1
pii(a
(j)
i |s(j))
∑
a
(j−1)
−i
T (s(j)|s(j−1), a(j−1))pi?−i(a(j)−i |s(j))
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be the probability of generating the sequence τi using policy pii and pi?−i. Then
lim
t→∞L
(t+1)
r (pi
?, λ?pi) =
N∑
i=1
Epii,pi?−i [ri(s, a)]−
N∑
i=1
Epi?i ,pi?−i [ri(s, a)] (9)
where L(t+1)r (pi?, λ?pi) corresponds to the dual function where the multipliers are the probability
of generating their respective trajectories of length t.
We provide a proof in Appendix A.3. Intuitively, the λ?(τi) weights correspond to the
probability of generating trajectory τi when the policy is pii for agent i and pi?−i for the other
agents. As t→∞, the first term of left hand side in Equation 9, ∑Ni=1∑τi∈T ti λ(τi)Q(t)i (τi),
converges to the expected total reward Epii,pi?−i [ri], which is the first term of right hand side.
The marginal of λ? over the initial states is the initial state distribution, so the second term
of left hand side,
∑
s vˆ(s)η(s), converges to Epi?i ,pi?−i [ri], which is the second term of right
hand side. Thus, the left hand side and right hand side of Equation 9 are the same as t→∞.
Theorem 4 motivates the following definition of multi-agent IRL with regularizer ψ.
MAIRLψ(piE) = arg max
r
−ψ(r) +
N∑
i=1
(EpiE [ri])−
(
max
pi
N∑
i=1
(βHi(pii) + Epii,piE−i [ri])
)
,
(10)
where Hi(pii) = Epii,piE−i [− log pii(ai|s)] is the discounted causal entropy for policy pii when
other agents follow piE−i , and β is a hyper-parameter controlling the strength of the entropy
regularization term as in (Ho and Ermon, 2016). This formulation is a strict generalization
to the single agent IRL in (Ho and Ermon, 2016).
Corollary 5 If N = 1, β = 1 then MAIRLψ(piE) = IRLψ(piE).
Furthermore, if the regularization ψ is additively separable, and for each agent i, piEi is the
unique optimal response to other experts piE−i , we obtain the following:
Theorem 6 Assume that ψ(r) =
∑N
i=1 ψi(ri), ψi is convex for each i ∈ [N ], and that
MARL(r) has a unique solution2 for all r ∈ MAIRLψ(piE), then
MARL ◦MAIRLψ(piE) = arg min
pi∈Π
N∑
i=1
−βHi(pii) + ψ?i (ρpii,E−i − ρpiE )
where pii,E−i denotes pii for agent i and piE−i for other agents.
The above theorem suggests that ψ-regularized multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning
is seeking, for each agent i, a policy whose occupancy measure is close to one where we
replace policy pii with expert piEi , as measured by the convex function ψ?i .
However, we do not assume access to the expert policy piE during training, so it is not
possible to obtain ρpii,E−i . In the settings of this paper, we consider an alternative approach
where we match the occupancy measure between ρpiE and ρpi instead. We can obtain our
practical algorithm if we select an adversarial reward function regularizer and remove the
effect from entropy regularizers.
2. The set of Nash equilibria is not always convex, so we have to assume MARL(r) returns a unique solution.
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Proposition 7 If β = 0, and ψ(r) =
∑N
i=1 ψi(ri) where ψi(ri) = EpiE [g(ri)] if ri > 0; +∞
otherwise, and
g(x) =
{ −x− log(1− ex) if ri > 0
+∞ otherwise
then
arg min
pi
N∑
i=1
ψ?i (ρpii,piE−i − ρpiE ) = arg minpi
N∑
i=1
ψ?i (ρpii,pi−i − ρpiE ) = piE
Theorem 6 and Proposition 7 discuss the differences from the single agent scenario. On
the one hand, in Theorem 6 we make the assumption that MARL(r) has a unique solution,
which is always true in the single agent case due to convexity of the space of the optimal
policies. On the other hand, in Proposition 7 we remove the entropy regularizer because
here the causal entropy for pii may depend on the policies of the other agents, so the entropy
regularizer on two sides are not the same quantity. Specifically, the entropy for the left hand
side conditions on piE−i and the entropy for the right hand side conditions on pi−i (which
would disappear in the single-agent case).
4. Practical multi-agent imitation learning
Despite the recent successes in deep RL, it is notoriously hard to train policies with RL
algorithmsbecause of high variance gradient estimates. This is further exacerbated in Markov
games since an agent’s optimal policy depends on other agents (Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster
et al., 2016). In this section, we address these problems and propose practical algorithms for
multi-agent imitation.
4.1 Multi-agent generative adversarial imitation learning
We select ψi to be our reward function regularizer in Proposition 7; this corresponds to
the two-player game introduced in Generative Adversarial Imitation Learning (GAIL, (Ho
and Ermon, 2016)). For each agent i, we have a discriminator (denoted as Dωi) mapping
state action-pairs to scores optimized to discriminate expert demonstrations from behaviors
produced by pii. Implicitly, Dωi plays the role of a reward function for the generator, which
in turn attempts to train the agent to maximize its reward thus fooling the discriminator.
We optimize the following objective:
min
θ
max
ω
Epiθ
[
N∑
i=1
logDωi(s, ai)
]
+ EpiE
[
N∑
i=1
log(1−Dωi(s, ai))
]
(11)
We update piθ through reinforcement learning, where we also use a baseline Vφ to reduce
variance. We outline the algorithm – Multi-Agent GAIL (MAGAIL) – in Appendix B.
We can augment the reward regularizer ψ(r) using an indicator y(r) denoting whether r
fits our prior knowledge; the augmented reward regularizer ψˆ : RS×A → R ∪ {∞} is then:
ψ(r) if y(r) = 1 and ∞ if y(r) = 0. We introduce three types of y(r) for common settings.
Centralized The easiest case is to assume that the agents are fully cooperative, i.e. they
share the same reward function. Here y(r) = I(r1 = r2 = . . . rn) and ψ(r) = ψGA(r). One
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(o1, a1) (o2, a2)
(o1, a1) (o2, a2)
D
T (st+1|st, at)
(a) Centralized (Cooperative)
(o1, a1) (o2, a2)
(o1, a1) (o2, a2)
D1 D2
T (st+1|st, at)
(b) Decentralized (Mixed)
(o1, a1)
(o2, a2)(o1, a1)
(o2, a2)
D1 = −D2
(c) Zero-sum (Competitive)
Figure 1: Different MAGAIL algorithms obtained with different priors on the reward structure.
The discriminator tries to assign higher rewards to top row and low rewards to bottom row.
In centralized and decentralized, the policy operates with the environment to match the
expert rewards. In zero-sum, the policy do not interact with the environment; expert and
policy trajectories are paired together as input to the discriminator.
could argue this corresponds to the GAIL case, where the RL procedure operates on multiple
agents (a joint policy).
Decentralized We make no prior assumptions over the correlation between the rewards.
Here y(r) = I(ri ∈ ROi×Ai) and ψi(ri) = ψGA(ri). This corresponds to one discriminator
for each agent which discriminates the trajectories as observed by agent i. However, these
discriminators are not learned independently as they interact indirectly via the environment.
Zero Sum Assume there are two agents that receive opposite rewards, so r1 = −r2. As
such, ψ is no longer additively separable. Nevertheless, an adversarial training procedure
can be designed using the following fact:
v(piE1 , pi2) ≥ v(piE1 , piE2) ≥ v(pi1, piE2)
where v(pi1, pi2) = Epi1,pi2 [r1(s, a)] is the expected outcome for agent 1. The discriminator could
maximize the reward for trajectories in (piE1 , pi2) and minimize the reward for trajectories in
(pi2, piE1).
These three settings are in summarized in Figure 1.
4.2 Multi-agent actor-critic with Kronecker factors
To optimize over the generator parameters θ in Eq. (11) we wish to use an algorithm for
multi-agent RL that has good sample efficiency in practice. Our algorithm, which we refer to
as Multi-agent Actor-Critic with Kronecker-factors (MACK), is based on Actor-Critic with
Kronecker-factored Trust Region (ACKTR, (Wu et al., 2017)), a state-of-the-art natural
policy gradient (Amari, 1998; Kakade, 2002) method in deep RL. MACK uses the framework
of centralized training with decentralized execution (Foerster et al., 2016); policies are trained
with additional information to reduce variance but such information is not used during
execution time. We let the advantage function of every agent agent be a function of all
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agents’ observations and actions:
Apiiφi(s, at) =
k−1∑
j=0
(γjr(st+j , at+j) + γ
kV piiφi (st+k, a−i,t))V
pii
φi
(st, a−i,t) (12)
where V piiφi (sk, a−i) is the baseline for i, utilizing the additional information (a−i) for variance
reduction. We use (approximated) natural policy gradients to update both θ and φ but
without trust regions to schedule the learning rate – a linear decay learning rate schedule
achieves similar empirical performance.
MACK has some notable differences from Multi-Agent Deep Deterministic Policy Gra-
dient (Lowe et al., 2017). On the one hand, MACK does not assume knowledge of other
agent’s policies nor tries to infer them; the value estimator merely collects experience from
other agents (and treats them as black boxes). On the other hand, MACK does not require
gradient estimators such as Gumbel-softmax (Jang et al., 2016; Maddison et al., 2016) to
optimize over discrete actions, which is necessary for DDPG (Lillicrap et al., 2015).
5. Experiments
We evaluate the performance of (centralized, decentralized, and zero-sum versions) of MA-
GAIL under two types of environments. One is a particle environment which allows for
complex interactions and behaviors; the other is a control task, where multiple agents try to
cooperate and move a plank forward. We collect results by averaging over 5 random seeds.
Our implementation is based on OpenAI baselines (Dhariwal et al., 2017); please refer to
Appendix C for implementation details.
We compare our methods (centralized, decentralized, zero-sum MAGAIL) with two
baselines. The first is behavior cloning (BC), which learns a maximum likelihood estimate
for ai given each state s and does not require actions from other agents. The second baseline
is the GAIL IRL baseline that operates on each agent separately – for each agent we first
pretrain the other agents with BC, and then train the agent with GAIL; we then gather the
trained GAIL policies from all the agents and evaluate their performance.
5.1 Particle environments
We first consider the particle environment proposed in (Lowe et al., 2017), which consists of
several agents and landmarks. We consider two cooperative environments and two competitive
ones. All environments have an underlying true reward function that allows us to evaluate
the performance of learned agents.
The environments include: Cooperative Communication – two agents must cooperate
to reach one of three colored landmarks. One agent (“speaker”) knows the goal but cannot
move, so it must convey the message to the other agent (“listener”) that moves but does
not observe the goal. Cooperative Navigation – three agents must cooperate through
physical actions to reach three landmarks; ideally, each agent should cover a single landmark.
Keep-Away – two agents have contradictory goals, where agent 1 tries to reach one of the
two targeted landmarks, while agent 2 (the adversary) tries to keep agent 1 from reaching its
target. The adversary does not observe the target, so it must act based on agent 1’s actions.
Predator-Prey – three slower cooperating adversaries must chase the faster agent in a
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Figure 2: Average true reward from cooperative tasks. Performance of experts and random
policies are normalized to one and zero respectively. We use inverse log scale for better
comparison.
randomly generated environment with obstacles; the adversaries are rewarded by touching
the agent while the agent is penalized.
For the cooperative tasks, we use an analytic expression defining the expert policy; for
the competitive tasks, we use MACK to train expert policies based on the true underlying
rewards (using larger policy and value networks than the ones that we use for imitation). We
then use the expert policies to simulate trajectories D, and then do imitation learning on D as
demonstrations, where we assume the underlying rewards are unknown. Following (Li et al.,
2017), we pretrain our Multi-Agent GAIL methods and the GAIL baseline using behavior
cloning as initialization to reduce sample complexity for exploration. We consider 100 to
400 episodes of expert demonstrations, each with 50 timesteps, which is close to the amount
of timesteps used for the control tasks in Ho and Ermon (2016). Moreover, we randomly
sample the starting position of agent and landmarks each episode, so our policies have to
learn to generalize when they encounter new settings.
5.1.1 Cooperative tasks
We evaluate performance in cooperative tasks via the average expected reward obtained by
all the agents in an episode. In this environment, the starting state is randomly initialized,
so generalization is crucial. We do not consider the zero-sum case, since it violates the
cooperative nature of the task. We display the performance of centralized, decentralized,
GAIL and BC in Figure 2.
Naturally, the performance of BC and MAGAIL increases with more expert demonstra-
tions. MAGAIL performs consistently better than BC in all the settings; interestingly, in the
cooperative communication task, centralized MAGAIL is able to achieve expert-level perfor-
mance with only 200 demonstrations, but BC fails to come close even with 400 trajectories.
Moreover, the centralized MAGAIL performs slightly better than decentralized MAGAIL
due to the better prior, but decentralized MAGAIL still learns a highly correlated reward
between two agents.
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Table 1: Average agent rewards in competitive tasks. We compare behavior cloning (BC),
GAIL (G), Centralized (C), Decentralized (D), and Zero-Sum (ZS) methods. Best marked in
bold (high vs. low rewards is preferable depending on the agent vs. adversary role).
Task Predator-Prey
Agent Behavior Cloning G C D ZS
Adversary BC G C D ZS Behavior Cloning
Rewards -93.20 -93.71 -93.75 -95.22 -95.48 -90.55 -91.36 -85.00 -89.4
Task Keep-Away
Agent Behavior Cloning G C D ZS
Adversary BC G C D ZS Behavior Cloning
Rewards 24.22 24.04 23.28 23.56 23.19 26.22 26.61 28.73 27.80
5.1.2 Competitive tasks
We consider all three types of Multi-Agent GAIL (centralized, decentralized, zero-sum) and
BC in both competitive tasks. Since there are two opposing sides, it is hard to measure
performance directly. Therefore, we compare by letting (agents trained by) BC play against
(adversaries trained by) other methods, and vice versa. From Table 1, decentralized and
zero-sum MAGAIL often perform better than centralized MAGAIL and BC, which suggests
that the selection of the suitable prior ψˆ is important for good empirical performance. More
details for all the particle environments are in the appendix.
5.2 Cooperative control
In some cases we are presented with sub-optimal expert demonstrations because the environ-
ment has changed; we consider this case in a cooperative control task (K. Gupta and Egorov,
2017), where N bipedal walkers cooperate to move a long plank forward; the agents have
incentive to collaborate since the plank is much longer than any of the agents. The expert
demonstrates its policy on an environment with no bumps on the ground and heavy weights,
while we perform imitation in an new environment with bumps and lighter weights (so one is
likely to use too much force). Agents trained with BC tend to act more aggressively and fail,
whereas agents trained with centralized MAGAIL can adapt to the new environment. With
10 (imperfect) expert demonstrations, BC agents have a chance of failure of 39.8% (with a
reward of 1.26), while centralized MAGAIL agents fail only 26.2% of the time (with a reward
of 26.57). We show videos of respective policies in the supplementary.
6. Related work and discussion
There is a vast literature on single-agent imitation learning (Bagnell, 2015). Behavior
Cloning (BC) learns the policy through supervised learning (Pomerleau, 1991). Inverse
Reinforcement Learning (IRL) assumes the expert policy optimizes over some unknown
reward, recovers the reward, and learns the policy through reinforcement learning (RL). BC
does not require knowledge of transition probabilities or access to the environment, but
suffers from compounding errors and covariate shift (Ross and Bagnell, 2010; Ross et al.,
2011).
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Most existing work in multi-agent imitation learning assumes the agents have very specific
reward structures. The most common case is fully cooperative agents, where the challenges
mainly lie in other factors, such as unknown role assignments (Le et al., 2017), scalability
to swarm systems (Šošic et al., 2016) and agents with partial observations (Bogert and
Doshi, 2014). In non-cooperative settings, Lin et al. (2014) consider the case of IRL for
two-player zero-sum games and cast the IRL problem as Bayesian inference, while Reddy et al.
(2012) assume agents are non-cooperative but the reward function is a linear combination of
pre-specified features.
Our work is the first to propose a general multi-agent IRL framework that bridges
the gap between state-of-the art multi-agent reinforcement learning methods (Lowe et al.,
2017; Foerster et al., 2016) and implicit generative models such as generative adversarial
networks (Goodfellow et al., 2014). Experimental results demonstrate that it is able to
imitate complex behaviors in high-dimensional environments with both cooperative and
adversarial interactions. An interesting research direction is to explore new techniques for
gathering expert demonstration; for example, when the expert is allowed to aid the agents
by participating in part of the agent’s learning process (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016).
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Appendix A. Proofs
We use vˆi(s), qˆi(s, ai) and Q(τ) to represent vˆi(s;pi, r), qˆi(s, ai;pi, r) and Q(τ ;pi, r), where
we implicitly assume dependency over pi and r.
A.1 Proof to Lemma 8
For any policy pi, fr(pi, vˆ) = 0 when vˆ is the value function of pi (due to Bellman equations).
However, only policies that form a Nash equilibrium satisfies the constraints in Eq. 2; we
formalize this in the following Lemma.
Lemma 8 Let vˆi(s;pi, r) be the solution to the Bellman equation
vˆi(s) = Epi[ri(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s′|s,a)vˆi(s′)]
and qˆi(s, ai) = Epi−i [ri(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S T (s
′|s,a)vˆi(s′)]. Then for any pi,
fr(pi, vˆ(pi)) = 0
Furthermore, pi is Nash equilibrium under r if and only if vˆi(s) ≥ qˆi(s, ai) for all i ∈ [N ], s ∈
S, ai ∈ Ai.
Proof By definition of vˆi(s) we have:
vˆi(s) = Epi[ri(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s′|s,a)vˆi(s′)]
= EpiiEpi−i [ri(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s′|s,a)vˆi(s′)]
= Epii [qˆi(s, ai)]
which uses the fact that ai and a−i are independent conditioned on s. Hence fr(pi, vˆ) = 0
immediately follows.
If pi is a Nash equilibrium, and at least one of the constrains does not hold, i.e. there
exists some i and s, ai such that vˆ(s) < qˆ(s, ai), then agent i can achieve a strictly higher
expected return if it chooses to take actions ai whenever it encounters state si and follow pii
for rest of the states, which violates the Nash equilibrium assumption.
If the constraints hold, i.e. for all i and (s, ai), vˆi(s) ≥ qˆi(s, ai) then
vˆi(s) ≥ Epii [qˆi(s, ai)] = vˆi(s)
so value iteration over vˆi(s) converges. If we can find another policy pi′ such that vˆi(s) <
Epi′i [qˆi(s, ai)], then there should be at least one violation in the constraints since pi
′
i must be
a convex combination (expectation) over actions ai. Therefore, for any policy pi′i and action
ai for any agent i, Epii [qˆi(s, ai)] ≥ Epi′i [qˆi(s, ai)] always hold, so pii is the optimal response to
pi−i, and pi constitutes a Nash equilibrium when we repeat this argument for all agents.
Notably, Theorem 3.8.2 in Filar and Vrieze (2012) discusses the equivalence by assuming
fr(pi, v) = 0 for some v; if v satisfies the assumptions, then v = vˆ′.
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A.2 Proof to Theorem 3
Proof If pi is a Nash equilibrium, and at least one of the constraints does not hold, i.e.
there exists some i and {s(j), a(j)i }tj=0, such that
vˆi(s
(0)) < Epi−i [qˆ
(t)
i ({s(j),a(j)}t−1j=0, s(t), a(t)i )]
Then agent i can achieve a strictly higher expected return on its own if it chooses a particular
sequence of actions by taking a(j)i whenever it encounters state s
(j), and follow pii for the
remaining states. We note that this is in expectation over the policy of other agents. Hence,
we construct a policy for agent i that has strictly higher value than pii without modifying
pi−i, which contradicts the definition of Nash equilibrium.
If the constraints hold, i.e for all i and {s(j), a(j)i }tj=0,
vˆi(s
(0)) ≥ Epi−i [qˆ(t)i ({s(j),a(j)}t−1j=0, s(t), a(t)i )]
then we can construct any qˆi(s(0), a
(0)
i ) via a convex combination by taking the expectation
over pii:
qˆi(s
(0), a
(0)
i ) = Epii [Epi−i [qˆ
(t)
i ({s(j),a(j)}t−1j=0, s(t), a(t)i )]]
where the expectation over pii is taken over actions {a(j)i }tj=0 (the expectation over states are
contained in the inner expectation over pi−i). Therefore, ∀i ∈ [N ], s ∈ S, ai ∈ Ai,
vˆi(s) ≥ qˆi(s, ai)
and we recover the constraints in Eq. 2. By Lemma 8, pi is a Nash equilibrium.
A.3 Proof to Theorem 4
Proof We use Q?, qˆ?, vˆ? to denote the Q, qˆ and vˆ quantities defined for policy pi?. For the
two terms in L(t+1)r (pi?, λ?pi) we have:
L(t+1)r (pi
?, λ?pi) =
N∑
i=1
∑
τi∈Ti
λ?(τi)(Q
?
i (τi)− vˆ?i (s(0))) (13)
For any agent i, we note that
∑
τi∈Ti
λ?(τi)Q
?
i (τi) = EpiiEpi?−i [
t−1∑
j=0
γjri(s
(j), a(j)) + γtqˆ?i (s
t, a
(t)
i )]
which amounts to using pii for agent i for the first t steps and using pi?i for the remaining
steps, whereas other agents follow pi?−i. As t→∞, this converges to Epii,pi?−i [ri] since γt → 0
and q?i (s
(t), a
(t)
i ) is bounded. Moreover, for vˆ
?
i (s
(0)), we have∑
τi∈Ti
λ?(τi)vˆ
?
i (s
(0)) = Es(0)∼η[vˆ
?
i (s
(0))] = Epi? [ri]
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Combining the two we have
L(t+1)r (pi
?, λ?pi) =
N∑
i=1
Epii,pi?−i [ri]−
N∑
i=1
Epi? [ri]
which describes the differences in expected rewards.
A.4 Proof to Theorem 6
Proof Define the “MARL” objective for a single agent i where other agents have policy piEi :
MARLi(ri) = max
pii
Hi(pii) + Epii,piE−i [ri]
Define the “MAIRL” objective for a single agent i where other agents have policy piE :
MAIRLi,ψ(pi?) = arg max
ri
ψi(ri) + EpiE [ri]− (maxpii Hi(pii) + Epii,piE−i [ri])
Since ri and pii’s are independent in the MAIRL objective, the solution to MAIRLψ can be
represented by the solutions of MAIRLi,ψ for each i:
MAIRLψ = [MAIRL1,ψ, . . . ,MAIRLN,ψ]
Moreover, the single agent “MARL” objective MARLi(ri) has a unique solution piEi , which
also composes the (unique) solution to MARL (which we assumed in Section 3. Therefore,
MARL(r) = [MARL1(r1), . . . ,MARLN (rN )]
So we can use Proposition 3.1 in Ho and Ermon (2016) for each agent i with MARLi(ri) and
MAIRLi,ψ(pi?) and achieve the same solution as MARL ◦MAIRLψ.
A.5 Proof to Proposition 7
Proof From Corollary A.1.1 in Ho and Ermon (2016), we have
ψ?GA(ρpi − ρpiE ) = max
D∈(0,1)S×A
Epi[logD(s, a)] + EpiE [log(1−D(s, a))] ≡ DJS(ρpi, ρpiE )
where DJS denotes Jensen-Shannon divergence (which is a squared metric), and ≡ denotes
equivalence up to shift and scaling.
Taking the min over this we obtain
arg min
pi
N∑
i=1
ψ?GA(ρpi − ρpiE ) = piE
Similarly,
arg min
pi
N∑
i=1
ψ?GA(ρpii,piE−i − ρpiE ) = piE
So these two quantities are equal.
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Appendix B. MAGAIL Algorithm
We include the MAGAIL algorithm as follows:
Algorithm 1 Multi-Agent GAIL (MAGAIL)
Input: Initial parameters of policies, discriminators and value (baseline) estimators θ0, ω0,
φ0; expert trajectories D = {(sj , aj)}Mj=0; batch size B; Markov game as a black box
(N,S,A, η, T, r,o, γ).
Output: Learned policies piθ and reward functions Dω.
for u = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
Obtain trajectories of size B from pi by the process: s0 ∼ η(s), at ∼ piθu(at|st), st+1 ∼
T (st|at).
Sample state-action pairs from D with batch size B.
Denote state-action pairs from pi and D as χ and χE .
for i = 1, . . . , n do
Update ωi to increase the objective
Eχ[logDωi(s, ai)] + EχE [log(1−Dωi(s, ai))]
end for
for i = 1, . . . , n do
Compute value estimate V ? and advantage estimate Ai for (s, a) ∈ χ.
Update φi to decrease the objective
Eχ[(Vφ(s, a−i)− V ?(s, a−i))2]
Update θi by policy gradient with small step sizes:
Eχ[∇θipiθi(ai|oi)Ai(s, a)]
end for
end for
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Table 2: Performance in cooperative navigation.
# Expert Episodes 100 200 300 400
Expert -13.50 ± 6.3
Random -128.13 ± 32.1
Behavior Cloning -56.82 ± 18.9 -43.10 ± 16.0 -35.66 ± 15.2 -25.83 ± 12.7
Centralized -46.66 ± 20.8 -23.10 ± 12.4 -21.53 ± 12.9 -15.30 ± 7.0
Decentralized -50.00 ± 18.6 -25.61 ± 12.3 -24.10 ± 13.3 -15.55 ± 6.5
GAIL -55.01 ± 17.7 -39.21 ± 16.5 -29.89 ± 13.5 -18.76 ± 12.1
Table 3: Performance in cooperative communication.
# Expert Episodes 100 200 300 400
Expert -6.22 ± 4.5
Random -62.49 ± 28.7
Behavior Cloning -21.25 ± 10.6 -13.25 ± 7.4 -11.37 ± 5.9 -10.00 ± 5.36
Centralized -15.65 ± 10.0 -7.11 ± 4.8 -7.11 ± 4.8 -7.09 ± 4.8
Decentralized -18.68 ± 10.4 -8.06 ± 5.3 -8.16 ± 5.5 -7.34 ± 4.9
GAIL -20.28 ± 10.1 -11.06 ± 7.8 -10.51 ± 6.6 -9.44 ± 5.7
Appendix C. Experiment Details
C.1 Hyperparameters
For the particle environment, we use two layer MLPs with 128 cells in each layer, for the
policy generator network, value network and the discriminator. We use a batch size of 1000.
The policy is trained using K-FAC optimizer (Martens and Grosse, 2015) with learning rate
of 0.1. All other parameters for K-FAC optimizer are the same in (Wu et al., 2017).
For the cooperative control task, we use two layer MLPs with 64 cells in each layer
for all the networks. We use a batch size of 2048, and learning rate of 0.03. We obtain
expert trajectories by training the expert with MACK and sampling demonstrations from
the same environment. Hence, the expert’s demonstrations are imperfect (or even flawed) in
the environment that we test on.
C.2 Detailed Results
We use the particle environment introduced in (Lowe et al., 2017) and the multi-agent control
environment (K. Gupta and Egorov, 2017) for experiments. We list the exact performance
in Tables 2, 3 for cooperative tasks, and Table 4 and competitive tasks. The means and
standard deviations are computed over 100 episodes. The policies in the cooperative tasks
are trained with varying number of expert demonstrations. The policies in the competitive
tasks are trained with on a dataset with 100 expert trajectories.
The environment for each episode is drastically different (e.g. location of landmarks are
randomly sampled), which leads to the seemingly high standrad deviation across episodes.
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Table 4: Performance in competitive tasks.
Task Agent Policy Adversary Policy Agent Reward
Predator-Prey
Behavior Cloning
Behavior Cloning -93.20 ± 63.7
GAIL -93.71 ± 64.2
Centralized -93.75 ± 61.9
Decentralized -95.22 ± 49.7
Zero-Sum -95.48 ± 50.4
GAIL
Behavior Cloning
-90.55 ± 63.7
Centralized -91.36 ± 58.7
Decentralized -85.00 ± 42.3
Zero-Sum -89.4 ± 48.2
Keep-Away
Behavior Cloning
Behavior Cloning 24.22 ± 21.1
GAIL 24.04 ± 18.2
Centralized 23.28 ± 20.6
Decentralized 23.56 ± 19.9
Zero-Sum 23.19 ± 19.9
GAIL
Behavior Cloning
26.22 ± 19.1
Centralized 26.61 ± 20.0
Decentralized 28.73 ± 18.3
Zero-Sum 27.80 ± 19.2
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Figure 3: Sample complexity of multi-agent GAIL methods under cooperative tasks. Perfor-
mance of experts is normalized to one, and performance of behavior cloning is normalized
to zero. The standard deviation is computed with respect to episodes, and is noisy due to
randomness in the environment.
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C.3 Video Demonstrations
We show certain trajectories generated by our methods. The vidoes are here: videos3.
For the particle case:
Navigation-BC-Agents.gif Agents trained by behavior cloning in the navigation task.
Navigation-GAIL-Agents.gif Agents trained by proposed framework in the navigation
task.
Predator-Prey-BC-Agent-BC-Adversary.gif Agent (green) trained by behavior cloning
play against adversaries (red) trained by behavior cloning.
Predator-Prey-GAIL-Agent-BC-Adversary.gif Agent (green) trained by proposed frame-
work play against adversaries (red) trained by behavior cloning.
For the cooperative control case:
Multi-Walker-Expert.mp4 Expert demonstrations in the “easy” environment.
Multi-Walker-GAIL.mp4 Centralized GAIL trained on the “hard” environment.
Multi-Walker-BC.mp4 BC trained on the “hard” environment.
Interestingly, the failure modes for the agents in “hard” environment is mostly having
the plank fall off or bounce off, since by decreasing the weight of the plank will decrease its
friction force and increase its acceleration.
3. https://drive.google.com/open?id=1Oz4ezMaKiIsPUKtCEOb6YoHJ9jLk6zbj
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